

## THE THEORY OF MONETARY POLICY

### Part One

#### Monetary policy goals and instruments

- Chapter 1      Definition and measurement of monetary aggregates  
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- Chapter 2      Monetary policy goals and indicators  
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- Chapter 3      Monetary policy instruments  
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- Chapter 2      Inflation targeting strategies  
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[The indications in brackets refer to the corresponding chapters in the textbook: R = Rossi (2008).]

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